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0. Abstract 
This paper addresses the risk cutoff policies of a retail bank whose objectives are to maximize return on 
equity for shareholders and live within regulatory capital requirements, such as those of the Basel 
Capital Accord, to meet unexpected default losses. It investigates the changes that have to be made in the 
operating decision of which applicants for loans to accept and which to reject because of the changes in 
the financial regulations imposed on the bank.  It is assumed that portfolios consist entirely of consumer 
credit accounts (mortgages, auto loans, revolving credit…) for which acquisition risk scores are 
available to the lender and regulator. The solutions that we obtain not only yield an optimal cutoff score 
for default risk but also optimal pricing conditions for additional equity capital in the event that the 
existing level can not satisfy the regulatory requirements. The paper concludes with several numerical 
examples illustrating the effects of current and proposed Basel regulations. We believe that some 
important insights are derived from this formulation linking the financial variables such as the lending 
and borrowing rates, and the debt and equity structure of the lender and the operational decisions of 
which level of risk to set as the cutoff in the consumer credit portfolios. 
Keywords:  Regulatory Capital, Equity Capital, Basel Accords,  Risk Scoring, Price of Capital 
1. Introduction 
In 1974 the Bank of International Settlements set up the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision to 
formulate supervisory standards and guidelines  following the failure of several large international 
banking organisations. The topic that has been highest on the Committee’s agenda in the last two 
decades has been the capital adequacy of banks.  Prior to 1988 it imposed no special capital requirements 
(Basel 0). Between 1988 and 2006, Basel regulations required that banks set aside a fixed percentage 
(8% in most cases ) of equity capital for each dollar that is loaned (Basel 1).  Beginning with the year 
2008, the Capital Accord proposed  by the Basel Committee will introduce an important new set of 
regulations governing capital adequacy whose terms require that the capital set aside per unit loan be a 
function of the loss given default and the probability of default (Basel 2). Portfolios of consumer loans REGULATORY CAPITAL:OLIVER/THOMAS  2  22 May 06 
such as revolving accounts (credit cards), auto loans, mortgages or personal loans will be affected.  The 
Basel Accord has raised the importance of consumer credit risk assessment methods such as credit and 
behavioural scoring within banks but it also requires  practitioners to be clearer in what such risk 
assessment systems actually measure, how they should be validated, and how they are used to influence 
operating policies and strategies.  These regulations will have an impact on the acquisition and  
maintenance policies of retail credit portfolios. In this paper we are primarily interested in the effects the 
new regulations will have on optimal acquisition policies as well as the shadow prices of constraints on 
regulatory capital and the tradeoffs between expected profit and volume. 
                            
Figure 1: Interactions between Regulatory Capital, Credit Scores and Acquisition Policies 
There is a three way relationship between capital adequacy regulations, the use of credit scoring in 
consumer lending and the operational decision to acquire and manage retail credit. It has long been 
recognised that credit scoring provides excellent tools for measuring and controlling credit risk in retail 
portfolios, by ranking the relative risk of the applicants for credit. Up to now many lenders have had 
similar products and operating policies which means that operating decisions have had little impact on 
their default scores and booking rates. As lending becomes more customized this will change and the 
data that will then be available to build new risk assessment scorecards will have in it both the riskiness 
of the different customers but also the impact of the different policies that were applied to them. The 
resulting problem of policy inference   what would have happened under a standard operating policy   
will make risk assessment more difficult. 
The connection between credit scoring and Basel regulations is clear. Without credit scoring one could 
not apply the internal ratings based approach (IRB) of the Basel regulations to portfolios of consumer 
loans – the area where one can make the most savings under IRB.  Moreover the Basel regulations are REGULATORY CAPITAL:OLIVER/THOMAS  3  22 May 06 
forcing credit scoring technology to continue improvement of its calibration techniques whereas 
previously the emphasis was on discriminatory power. The use test in the Basel regulations means that 
the way operating decisions are made is an integral part of the new Basel Accord.  In this paper we look 
at the last link – how the Basel regulations will affect operating decisions and specifically the decision 
on setting the accept/reject cut off. 
In the mathematical models that follow this introductory section we assume that the retail bank has in 
place a risk scoring system and appropriate databases; this means that the distribution of account scores, 
predictive distributions for the probability of default and non default are available to the lender and that 
it is possible to estimate statistical measures (such as the ROC Curves) that measure the quality of the 
discriminatory power of the risk scores and the resulting economic benefits. 
The fundamental requirement is that we have the conditional distribution functions (either cumulative or 
tail distributions for scores given a Good (non default) or a Bad (default) and estimates of the population 
odds of being Good or Bad which means that it is possible to obtain predictive risk distributions of 
business measures defined for individual accounts and portfolios of consumer credit accounts.  
We assume throughout that regulatory capital is derived from some or all of the equity capital and 
provides the legal reserves to withstand large unexpected losses in the higher risk assets. We also assume 
that some or all funds to source loans are derived from borrowings (debt).  The objective of this paper is 
to understand the consequences of the new Basel Accord on operational policies for controlling risk in 
retail credit portfolios. We have found it easier to encapsulate the regulatory requirements in terms of an 
arbitrary function of risk rather than the current detailed Basel formulas provided for mortgage, 
revolving and other retail risk; by doing so we rely on a continuous risk formulation that allows us to 
study the effect of changes in future regulations or the mathematical structure of improved designs. 
Optimal policies are expressed in terms of marginal profitability, shadow prices for regulatory capital 
and the tradeoffs between risk, profits and market share.  Specific numerical results are based on the 
existing Basel capital formulas. Figure 2 shows the requirement for the minimum  regulatory capital that 
needs to be set aside for each dollar loaned, ( ) D f p κ , if the chance of the loan defaulting is  p , and  D f is 
Loss Given Default (LGD) ,the fraction of the defaulted amount that is actually lost. This is given under 
the three cases  before there were any requirement ( Basel 0), under the 1988 Accord ( Basel 1), and 
under the new Accord ( Basel 2). REGULATORY CAPITAL:OLIVER/THOMAS  4  22 May 06 
 
Figure 2: Summary of Basel Capital Regulations for Retail   Consumer Portfolios 
 
Basel 2 has generated considerable interest in the credit risk of loan portfolios. The publication of the 
regulatory texts (BCBS 2004(a)(b)) was preceded by research on the models that would be appropriate 
(Gordy [2002]) and how they connected with existing ideas on Value at Risk (Jackson and 
Perraudin[2002]). These papers and most subsequent work concentrated on the impact of the Basel 
regulations on corporate lending. On the consumer (retail) side, there has been far less research and, so 
far as we know, none of it considered the impact on operating decisions. Allen DeLong and Saunders 
[2004] give an overview of the Basel accord and credit scoring and examine how corporate credit 
models are modified to deal with small business lending. Adam et al [2005] suggest an alternative credit 
risk model for retail lending by focusing on the dependence structure in mortgage lending, but they do 
not investigate the operational impact of their work or of the Basel Accord.  Perli and Najda [2004] also 
suggest an alternative approach to the Basel capital allocation; although they offer a model for the 
Basel 0 – (pre 1998) 
•  No capital needed to be set aside by banks to cover risk 
Basel 1 – (1988 2006) 
•  Basel regulations fix capital set aside as a constant fraction (8%) of loan 
Basel2 – (2007 beyond) 
•  Basel requires capital set aside to be function of default risk, p. 
•  If Loss given default,  D f , is 1 then capital set aside per unit loan is  ( ) p κ . 
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profitability of a consumer revolving loan they use it to suggest that the regulatory capital should be 
some percentile of the profitability distribution of the loan, rather than considering the effect on 
operating decision. Blochlinger and Leopold [2005] discuss profit maximising cut off decisions and how 
ROC curves can be used to make such decisions but there is no reference to capital pricing or allocation 
in their work.  
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 looks at the profitability model of a single loan with the 
different types of Basel and pre Basel capital reserve requirements.  Section 3 discusses the operating 
decision associated with a portfolio of such loans that wants to maximise expected profit and ROE. 
Section 4 extends the model by placing a lower bound on the required regulatory capital and shows how 
this leads to an optimal price that the firm should pay for additional equity capital to obtain an optimal 
accept/reject cut off decision. Section 5 explains how these results can be viewed in terms of ROC 
curves, while section 6 gives some numerical illustrations of the results when the current Basel 
requirements are imposed. Section 7 draws some conclusions from this work. 
 
2.   Expected Profit, Losses and Expenses for a Single Account 
In general, profit includes the revenues and expenses associated with lending and borrowing and the 
costs of economic capital (including regulatory capital) used to finance lending operations. These 
contributions can be written as the word equation:  
= − − − Profit   Revenue from loans Default losses Debt funding costs Fixed costs 
We define regulatory capital as the amount of equity (shareholder) capital required to cover a level of 
unusual or unexpected losses arising from defaults.  
The conditional expected profit for a single account from the acquisition of a single borrower with risk 
score s can therefore be written as  
− [ | ]  [ | ]  [ | ] B F E R s E L s E C s C  
where the notation R and L denotes random revenue and default losses. CB denotes the cost of borrowed 
debt and CF denotes the fixed costs for acquiring and operating a portfolio of loan accounts. These have 
no effect on the derivation of optimal policies but we include them for completeness.  
If the loan to a single borrower is one unit (a dollar, pound, Euro…) the gross expected profit on REGULATORY CAPITAL:OLIVER/THOMAS  6  22 May 06 
assets, A P  , is conditional on the risk score, s,  and has a mean value given by 
= − + = [ | ]   ( | ) ( | )         ( | ) ( | ) 1 A L D E P s r p G s f p B s p G s p B s  
where the loss given default (LGD) is fD, the outcome B denotes a default ( a Bad), G a non default ( a 
Good), the lending rate is rL and the conditional probabilities of defaulting or not depend on the risk 
score. Of the funds loaned by the bank to the borrowers, let the percentage borrowed from external 
sources be b, which is related to the leverage ratio. The net expected profit of an account  E P , ( the profit 
on equity) , subtracts the cost of debt (expressed by the borrowing rate, rB) from the gross expected 
profit, so 
− = − − + = ￿   [ | ] [ | ]   ( | ) ( | ) ;        ( | ) ( | ) 1 E A B L D B E P s E P s br r p G s f p B s br p G s p B s     (1a) 
The riskiness of the population who apply for such loan facilities is described by the distribution of the 
risk scores s where  ( ) f s is the density function of the score distribution. It is well known from Bayes’ 
Rule that the posterior probability and odds of non default are 
= = =
( | ) ( | ) ( | )
( | )  ,            ( )
( ) ( | ) ( | )
G G
B
p f s G p p G s f s G
p G s o s
f s p B s p f s B
 
where conditional Good and Bad likelihood functions are denoted by f(s|G) and  ( | ) f s B respectively. 
The odds of being a Good is the product of two factors, the first being the population odds (PopOdds) 
and the second being the ratio of the conditional score densities.  The PopOdds represents the a priori 
odds of a Good for a randomly selected individual from the population of interest and is independent of 
behavioral data for the individual; the second factor, on the other hand, depends on the economic and 
behavioral data of the individual and is usually obtained from proprietary financial databases or credit 
bureaus.  Policies that maximize expected profit of a portfolio of accounts are well known in the scoring 
literature and are expressed in terms of the conditional score densities (Hoadley and Oliver[1998], Oliver 
and Wells[2001], Thomas et. al. [2002]).  Using Bayes’ Rule in Equation 1(a) it is easy to rewrite the 
equation to show that the risk cutoff score that yields zero expected profit for an individual account is 
the solution of 
− − = ( | ) ( | ) ( ) 0 L G D B B r p f s G f p f s B br f s .  (1b) 
Larger scores yield positive and smaller scores yield negative expected account profit, which leads to the 
notion of a cutoff or point of indifference.  The first two terms involve the conditional score densities but 
the final term is the unconditional score density (i.e. the fraction of accounts having score s) as loan 
funds must be borrowed before it is known whether an individual account will default or not. By REGULATORY CAPITAL:OLIVER/THOMAS  7  22 May 06 
rearranging terms in Equation 1(b), we see that an optimal cutoff which accepts borrowers with positive 
expected profit is one where the odds of being a Good exceeds 
+
= = > >
−
*
*
*
( | )
                      
( | )
G D B D
L B
B L B L
p f s G f br f
o r r
p f s B r br r
.               (2) 
This cutoff depends only on economic parameters associated with borrowing and lending rates, LGD and  
leverage  but independent of the size of the loan. The last inequality in (2) confirms that the Good:Bad 
odds at the cut off point with debt financing must be higher than that without debt financing  (b=0).  
3. Portfolios of Accounts 
Before we consider the influence of regulatory capital it may be useful to review the optimal policies that 
apply to the unregulated case. The unconditional expected profit derived from a portfolio of loan assets 
is obtained from the conditional account profit by integrating over the risk profile of booked accounts, 
i.e. those above the cutoff score, sc, and subtracting the fixed costs: 
 
∞
= − = − − ∫
( ) ( ) [ ( )] [ | ] ( ) ( | ) ( | )
c
c c
A c A F L G c D B c F s E P s E P s dF s C r p F s G f p F s B C   (3) 
The difference between expectations 
[ | ] and [ ( )] A A c E P s E P s  
is that the former refers to the expected profit of a single account conditional on a risk score s while the 
latter is used to denote the expected revenue minus fixed costs derived from the loan assets in a portfolio 
of booked accounts with cutoff sc. If dF(s) ( ( ) f s ds if differentiable) denotes the fraction of accounts 
with risk score in the interval (s,s+ds]. The tail or complementary score distribution is denoted by F
(c)(•).  
The net expected profit (after cost of debt) for a portfolio with cutoff sc is therefore 
∞
−
= − − + −
∫ (4) ￿
( ) ( )
[ ( )] [ ( )] ( )                                                    
( ) ( | ) ( ) ( | )
c
E c A c B s
c c
L B G c D B B c F
E P s E P s br dF s
r br p F s G f br p F s B C
 
Given fixed equity capital Q, return on assets, rA (ROA), and return on equity, rE (ROE), are defined by  
−
=
+
￿ ￿
( )
( )
[ ( )] [ ( )] [ ( )] ( )
                            ( , )
( )
c
A c E c A c B c
A E c
c
E P s E P s E P s br F s
r r
Q bF s Q Q
5a b . 
If there is no requirement for regulatory capital and there is no risk based pricing or adverse selection by 
borrowers, the expected returns on equity and assets satisfy the fundamental Modigliani Miller REGULATORY CAPITAL:OLIVER/THOMAS  8  22 May 06 
proposition (Ho and Lee[2004]), which requires that the value of a firm is independent of the capital 
structure or the dividend policy. In a non deterministic world, the expected return on equity can be 
calculated from expected return on assets and the cost of debt by the formula:  
= + = + −
+ +
   or,  ( ) A E D E A A D
Q D D
r r r r r r r
Q D Q D Q
        (6a) 
In this equation A denotes assets, D denotes debt and Q is the equity of the firm. Obviously, ROE is 
proportional to the Debt/Equity ratio and is larger than ROA as long as the return on assets is greater 
than the (borrowing) cost of debt. Equation (6a) is easily verified for the retail portfolio by setting rD = 
rB in (5) and noting that for any cutoff 
+
+ − = − = =
+
( ) ( )
( )
[ ( )] ( ) ( ) [ ( )]
( )
( )
c c
A c c c E c
A A D B E c
c
E P s Q bF s bF s E P s D
r r r r r
Q Q bF s Q Q Q
.     (6b) 
With equity capital Q, ROE is maximized at the same cut off as that which maximizes the expected net 
profit of the acquired portfolio and occurs when the lender accepts all accounts above the optimal cutoff 
in Eqn. (2) 
+
= = = >
−
*
* *
*
( | )
( )
( | )
G c D B D
c
B c L B L
p f s G f br f
o o s
p f s B r br r
 
This cutoff represents the optimal Basel 0 solution when there is no regulatory capital requirement. As 
we have already discussed, this cutoff is always larger than the case where there is no borrowing and no 
debt capital. If all the funds are obtained by borrowing, the cut off is inversely proportional to the 
difference between the lending and borrowing rate. The larger the gap between rL and rB the more risky 
are the borrowers that the lender can accept, which, of course, is a primary consideration for requiring 
regulatory capital.  If all money loaned by the bank is obtained from borrowed funds, and no equity is 
required, the return on equity (ROE) is infinite. Though unrealistic for real banking applications, it 
nevertheless points out the enormous profits that can be made when one uses low cutoffs, accepts high 
risk loans, and obtains large market share with  >>     L B r r . 
4. Optimal Policies and Prices of a Regulatory Capital Requirement  
Regulatory capital is set aside for booked accounts before it is known whether the acquired account does 
or does not default. If the lender had perfect information there would be no need for regulatory capital as 
lenders could guarantee that they would only accept Good accounts.  One can easily incorporate the 
required amount of regulatory capital to support unexpected default losses within the decision model by 
explicitly including a cost for that requirement.   With this formulation the total cost of capital required REGULATORY CAPITAL:OLIVER/THOMAS  9  22 May 06 
to provide funds for a loan would now include the cost of regulatory capital as well as the borrowing 
costs for funds that source the loan. If the minimum capital requirement (MCR) per unit loan when 
LGD=1 is defined to be κ(s)= κ (p(s)) and the loss given default (LGD) is fD then total regulatory capital 
for a unit loan is fD κ (s). The  κ (s ) function required in the Basel Accord is given in Figure 2. 
As each account has a risk dependent regulatory capital requirement, total regulatory capital, K(s) is 
proportional to the amount loaned to all booked risky accounts: 
κ
∞
∫ ￿ ( ) ( ) ( ) D
s
K s f u dF u .  (7) 
The total regulatory capital set aside must be less than or equal to the total available equity capital, Q, 
after subtracting any equity used in financing the loans. This means that the decision problem can be 
restated with a constraint and an associated shadow price 
= − − − (8
( ) ( ) ( ) 1
( ) [ ( | ) ( | ) ( ) ]
c c c
E L G D B B F s s Maxr s Max r p F s G f p F s B br F s C
Q
a) 
subject to  
λ ≥ + − ≤
( ) 0: ( )  (1 ) ( )
c K s b F s Q             (8b) 
An equivalent problem since Q is given, is to find a stationary cutoff s and shadow price λ  so as to 
maximize the Lagrangian ( , ) s λ L  where 
( ) λ λ = − + − −
( ) ( , )   [ ( )] ( ) (1 ) ( )
c
E s E P s K s b F s Q L . 
Stationary points yield an equation linking the optimal odds cutoff and shadow price with the borrowing 
and lending rate and LGD. A necessary condition for optimality of (8) is that  
 
λ λ κ
λ
λ λ κ
+ + − +
= ≥
− − − −
* * *
* *
* * *
( (1 ) ) ( )
( )            0
( (1 ) ) ( )
D B D
L B D
f br b f s
o s
r br b f s
                (9) 
As both sides of (9) depend on the optimal cutoff, it is not always possible to obtain a closed form 
solution with λ≥0; however, it is easy to show that the optimal cutoff odds is unique and will be greater 
than or equal to that obtained with Basel 0.  The numerator is larger than or equal to the numerator in the 
case when no regulatory capital is required and the denominator is less than or equal to the denominator 
in that case; this means that the odds ratio is greater than or equal to the Basel 0 cutoff. The uniqueness 
of the optimal solution in (9) follows since as the cut off score s increases increases the odds on the left REGULATORY CAPITAL:OLIVER/THOMAS  10  22 May 06 
hand side of Equation (9) is monotone increasing. Also, if the κ(s) function is positive and monotone 
decreasing in the score the numerator of the right hand side is monotone decreasing and the denominator 
is monotone increasing. Thus, there is a single crossing and the solution is unique.  
Two possibilities arise: one corresponds to the situation (i) where the regulatory capital constraint is a 
strict inequality and the shadow price is zero (the unconstrained or Basel 0 solution). The other case (ii) 
occurs when there is insufficient equity to meet regulatory requirements and the institution may want to 
acquire additional equity to grow the business and take on greater profit and risk.  
Case (i) corresponds to an optimal shadow price  λ
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ = 0 and the familiar odds cutoff in Eqn (2).  In this 
case the expected net profit derived from assets in the retail credit portfolio is  
 
+
= − − + − =
−
* ( ) * ( ) * * [ ( )]   ( ) ( | ) ( ) ( | )               ln
c c D B
E L B G D B B F
L B
f br
E P s r br p F s G f br p F s B C s
r br
    (10) 
When condition (ii) holds the regulatory constraint in (8b) is binding and the optimal cutoff is 
determined by solving 
* ( ) * ( ) (1 ) ( )
c K s b F s Q +   = .  Instead of expressing the optimal cutoff odds in 
terms of borrowing and lending rates, the optimal shadow price is now determined by solving (9): 
  λ
κ κ
−
= = ≥
− + − +
* * *
*
* *
[ | ] ( ) [ | ]
   0
1 ( ) 1 ( )
A B E
D D
E P s br f s E P s
b f s b f s
.   (11) 
The numerator is the expected profit (net of default and borrowing costs) of the next acquisition; the 
denominator is the additional regulatory (and equity!) capital required for the acquisition so that the 
optimal price is just the marginal ROE, i.e. the ratio of marginal profit to marginal equity at the optimal 
cutoff.  The price of new equity capital is not specified a priori but rather is a result of an optimization 
problem in which both price and cutoffs are decision variables; obviously LGD, lending, borrowing rates 
and scoring technology affect the solutions. 
To summarize, the optimal solution for the shadow price of regulatory capital is given by 
λ
κ
+  =  −  = 
 + − =
 − + 
*
*
*
* * ( ) *
*
0 with  ln :  sufficient equity                     
[ | ]
  with   solution  of   ( ) (1 ) ( ) : insufficient equity 
1 ( )
D B
L B
c E
D
f br
s
r br
E P s
s K s b F s Q
b f s
  (12) 
which may be larger or smaller than the market price for additional equity. As λ* is the marginal profit 
increase for an extra unit of equity this assessment should help management decide whether or not to REGULATORY CAPITAL:OLIVER/THOMAS  11  22 May 06 
expand the retail credit portfolio in preference to other investments.  
We have assumed that both b and Q are fixed by some previous allocation and policy decisions by the 
bank and so one only has to determine the cut off, and hence the size of the portfolio, that maximizes 
expected profit and ROE. These occur at the same cut off because ROE equals profit divided by a fixed 
Q. As it is never optimal to have unused equity capital when the equity available exceeds the required 
regulatory capital, one can increase the profit and the return on equity by decreasing b, the fraction of 
borrowed funds.  On the other hand when the regulatory constraint is binding and the shadow price is 
greater than the borrowing rate, increased amounts of equity capital can be shifted to meet regulatory 
needs by borrowing additional funds at the rate rB.  
Consider the extreme case when all funds that source loans are borrowed, b=1 and the fixed cost CF is 
positive. Figure 3(a) is a plot of maximum expected portfolio profit versus equity capital along the high 
profit, low risk, low volume efficient frontier. When equity capital is small, optimal cutoffs are large, 
default losses and portfolio size are small as the optimal portfolio can only include the lowest risk 
borrowers. As equity (and regulatory) capital increase, expected profits from the portfolio increase as 
new borrowers are added, eventually reaching the value they would have had under Basel 0. Further 
increases in equity capital provide no additional increase in expected profits and only serve to decrease 
ROE. 
   
Figure 3(a): Efficient Frontier for Expected  Profit versus Equity Capital REGULATORY CAPITAL:OLIVER/THOMAS  12  22 May 06 
In Figure 3(a) optimal shadow prices are tangent lines to the efficient frontier and in Figure 3(b) they 
are shown by the dashed line. In Figure 3(a) the corresponding ROE is the slope of the line segment 
connecting the origin to the point of tangency and is shown as the solid line in Figure 3(b). Once 
sufficient borrower revenue is generated to overcome fixed costs, ROE becomes positive but smaller 
than the large shadow prices associate with small amounts of regulatory capital and few defaults.  
Initially, small increases in regulatory capital lead to increases in ROE, decreases in the shadow price 
with shadow price less than ROE. Eventually, one reaches a cutoff where the slope of the tangent line 
equals the slope of the line segment from the origin which means that the optimal shadow price equals 
the ROE. 
With further increases in equity capital the optimal ROE and the shadow price both decrease but ROE is 
always larger than the shadow price. To find the largest value of the optimal ROE as Q is varied, one 
finds the equity level where the optimal shadow price and optimal ROE are equal.  
We should point out that there are at least two variants of the problem that might be of interest to the 
corporate decision maker. If the equity is given and fixed by considerations external to the regulatory 
analysis then the maximum profit problem is equivalent to the maximum ROE problem as Q is not part 
of the decision problem and is unaffected by the maximization operator (Eqn. (8a)). On the other hand, 
if the only equity capital required by the bank is regulatory capital, then the denominator in the ROE 
ratio (Equation 5 (a,b)) is no longer fixed but varies with portfolio size and the risk composition of 
acquisitions; in this case the determination of equity capital becomes part of the decision problem.  
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Figure 3(b): Optimal ROC and Shadow Prices on Regulatory Capital 
5. Optimal Cutoffs and ROC Curves 
It is well known that iso contours of most business measures can be superimposed on the ROC curve of 
the score distribution which is a plot of the cumulative fractions of Bads rejected as a function of the 
cumulative number of Goods rejected for each possible cutoff point (Figure (4)). It is easy to show 
(Beling et. al. [2005]) that without regulatory capital constraints the slope of iso contours of expected 
profit in the ROC space is given by  
η
−
= =
+
0
( | )
   
( | )
G L B
B D B
p r br f s B
f s G p f br
 
In the unconstrained case the optimal cutoff is obtained when an iso contour with this slope is tangent to 
the ROC curve, i.e. the Basel 0 cutoff.  The slope of iso contours of expected volume (portfolio size) is 
always equal to the negative of the PopOdds, i.e. − G B p p and it is easy to see from Figure 4 how retail 
credit portfolios must calculate the tradeoffs between increasing volume and increasing profits.   REGULATORY CAPITAL:OLIVER/THOMAS  14  22 May 06 
 
Figure 4:  Iso-contours of Expected Profit and Volume in ROC Space 
With Basel 1 the optimal solution that maximizes expected return on equity, in the presence of the 
regulatory capital constraint, has slope 
λ λ
η λ
λ λ
− − − −
= ≥
+ + − +
* *
*
1 * *
( (1 ) ) 0.08
                   0
( (1 ) ) 0.08
G L B
B D B
p r br b
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When the shadow price is zero we have the Basel 0 solution and equity capital is sufficiently large to 
provide  the  required  regulatory  capital.  When  the  shadow  price  is  positive  the  optimal  cutoff  is 
determined by the solution of Equation (12) which is 
−   = −   − +  
* 1
2 1
1 0.08
Q
s F
b
 
This optimal cutoff, in turn, determines the shadow price and the slope of the iso profit line.  
With Basel 2 constraints, the slope of the iso profit lines is given by 
λ λ κ
η λ
λ λ κ
− − − −
= ≥
+ + − +
* * *
*
2 * * *
( (1 ) ) ( )
               0
( (1 ) ) ( )
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B D B D
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Figure 5: The Effect of Regulatory Capital Requirements on the ROC Operating Point 
 
6. Numerical Examples Comparing Basel 0-1-2  
In the numerical results that follow we calculate cutoffs where portfolio acquisition requires use of the 
Basel capital adequacy formula for Other Retail. For simplicity we assume that all the funds are 
borrowed (b=1) and all equity capital, if needed, is used to cover the regulatory requirements of Basel. 
As we require the conditional distributions for the probability of Good (Bad) outcomes, we have 
assumed that the density of p=p(s) is a Beta distribution with parameters (m,n) subject to the restriction 
that the PopOdds be given by the ratio m/n. It is easy to show that if the marginal density is Beta (m,n) 
the conditional densities of p given a Good (Bad) are then Beta(m+1,n) and Beta(m,n+1) respectively. 
With m=17, n=3, pG=0.0.850, the default rate for the population as a whole (not the acquired portfolio 
population) is equal to  0.150 and the PopOdds is o0=5.667. An examination of the ROC curve produced 
by this distributional assumption shows that it is consistent with the discriminatory power of many ROC 
curves obtained in practice and that it represents a moderately discriminatory scoring technology.  
In the examples that follow we assume b=1, fD=0.5, rB=0.05,  rL=0.10, , i.e. the bank lends at 10%, 
borrows at 5% in a portfolio where the loss given default is 50%. In the Basel 1 models we assume 
fD κ1=0.08 for revolving and other loans while the Basel 2 models use the regulatory capital formulae for 
other retail in Figure 2. We denote the three different cases by subscripts 0, 1 and 2. The reader should 
be careful to note that in the body of the paper we have used o0 to denote the PopOdds but that, in what 
follows, 
*
0 o denotes the optimal cutoff for the Basel 0 case.  REGULATORY CAPITAL:OLIVER/THOMAS  16  22 May 06 
Basel 0: When there is no Basle requirement κ =0, and Q=0.01 we obtain the familiar optimal cutoff: 
* * *
0 0 0
* * * *
0 0 0 0
* ( ) *
0 0
0.5 0.05
      11     ln 2.398     
0.1 0.05
( | ) 0.917;    ( | ) 1 0.083
0.0032
0.320; [ ( )] ( ) 0.203
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D B
L B
c
f r
o s o
r r
p G s p p B s p
ROE E V s F s
+ +
= = = ⇒ = =
− −
= = = − =
= = = =
            (13) 
where 
*
0 [ ( )] E V s  is the volume of accounts accepted , i.e. the fraction (approximately 20%) of the total 
original population accepted at the optimal cut off.  Expected portfolio profits and size require no 
regulatory capital and are independent of Q but ROE decreases inversely with Q.   
Basel 1: In Basel 1 the regulatory capital is a constant fDκ1=0.08 independent of risk level of accounts. In 
this case the optimal cutoff odds is either higher that Basel 0 because there is insufficient regulatory 
capital or is equal to the Basel 0 case when there is ample capital. This occurs when the capital is at least 
*
1 0 0.08 ( ) 0.08(0.203) 0.01624
c Q F s = = = . Using the solutions given in (9), (10), (11) and (12) for a 
given amount of equity capital Q, the optimal cut off, and the shadow price of equity satisfy 
* *
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1 1
*
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1
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= > ⇒ = = = −        (14) 
If Q=0.01 the optimal cutoff is determined by the binding constraint of Basel 1 capital requirements; this 
means that the cutoff is larger than the point at which Basel 0 ROE is maximized.  We have the 
following solution of these equations: 
( ) * *
1 1
* * * *
1 1 1 1
* *
* 1 1
1
* ( ) *
1 1
0.01 .08 ( ); 2.666
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c
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Basel 2:  Following Figure 2, the Basel 2 formulas require that the regulatory capital set aside κ(s) is  
given by  
1/2 1/2
1 1 1
    ( ))   (1 ( )) (0.999) (1  ( ))
1  1
D D s f N N p s N f p s
ρ
κ
ρ ρ
− −      
=  − + −       −      
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(N(x) is the cumulative distribution function of the unit normal and, in our notation, probability of 
default is 1 p(s)) Whereas the correlation is assumed to be the constant ρ=0.15 for mortgages and 0.04 
for revolving credit, the formula for other forms of retail credit such as personal loans is given by 
 35(1 ( )) 35(1 ( )) 1 1
  ( )  0.03 0.16 1 35 35 1 1
p s p s e e
s
e e
ρ
− − − − −
= + − − − − −
   
       
   
               (15b) 
Basel formulas for capital requirements are plotted in Figure (6). 
 
Figure 6: Basel 2 Capital Requirement Formulas for Retail Credit 
Solutions for the Basel 2 case are obtained from the following equations  
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With a capital restriction of Q=0.01, the optimal score cutoff for Basel 2is lower than that for Basel 1 
because the Basel 2 capital requirement is lower than that of Basel 1. Notice that in this case the equity 
level at which we can meet the unconstrained Basel 0 requirements is 
*
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The new cutoffs, shadow prices, and ROE are now given by 
* *
2 2
* * * *
2 2 2 2
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* 2 2
2
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Because the cutoff lies between the Basel 0 and Basel 1 solutions, the ROE, expected portfolio size and 
shadow price for new equity capital also lies between their respective Basel 0 and 1 values.   
As might be expected, the Basel 2 regulatory capital requirements are larger than those of Basel 1 when 
the loss given default is large. To illustrate such a case we examine the solutions when rL=0.15, fD=0.75 
Q=0.02. This example shows that increased capital requirements from Basel 2 leads to further reduction 
in portfolio size and reduced ROE than would be found under either Basel 0 or Basel 1. The results are 
summarized in Table 1 and in Figure 7 which compares the relative location of the operating points on 
the ROC curve. In these and previous examples it should be remembered that calculations of ROE are 
only based on regulatory capital which may be much smaller than equity capital; hence,  ROE numbers 
may appear to be unrealistically large.  Most U.S. banks have equity capital far in excess of the Basel 2 
requirements for regulatory capital. 
 
 
 
rL=0.15, rB=0.15, 
fD=0.75, Q=0.02 
Basel 0  Basel 1  Basel 2 
Score Cutoff, s
*  2.079  2.290  2.364 
Non-Default, p
*  0.889  0.908  0.914 
Default Rate, 1-p
*  0.111  0.092  0.086 
Shadow Price, λ λ λ λ
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗        N/A  0.170  0.235 
E[V(s
*)]  0.375  0.252  0.220 REGULATORY CAPITAL:OLIVER/THOMAS  19  22 May 06 
ROE  0.585  0.545  0.515 
Table 1: Optimal Solutions with rL=0.15, fD=0.75 Q=0.02 
 
 
Figure 7: Comparing Basel 0, 1, 2 Operating Points on the ROC Curve REGULATORY CAPITAL:OLIVER/THOMAS  20  22 May 06 
7. Conclusions 
Our analysis began with a base case, Basel 0, which allows the study of various business measures 
including expected profit and ROE in the absence of any capital adequacy requirements. The major 
conclusion one can draw from the mathematical models is that the introduction of regulatory 
requirements in Basel 1 and 2, will increase score cutoffs, with a consequent decrease of expected 
profits, portfolio size and ROE.  Depending on the particular assumptions about lending and borrowing 
rates and LGD, optimal cutoffs in Basel 2 will always be greater than or equal to the Basel 0 case but 
may be smaller or larger than the optimal Basel 1 cut offs.  If there is insufficient equity to provide the 
regulatory capital needed for the retail portfolio there is a positive shadow price one is willing to pay to 
obtain additional equity – this price may be different from the market price for new equity at similar risk 
levels and may suggest to management the need for alternative investments. Eventually, with sufficient 
regulatory capital the expected profits and ROE will yield the Basel 0 case at which point there is no 
value in obtaining additional equity capital.  
 
If there are no fixed costs, the shadow price for additional equity will always be less than ROE and will 
become infinitely large at very low equity levels because capital requirements are negligible when the 
marginally highest profit accounts are being accepted.  If, however, there are substantial fixed costs in 
the retail operations, at low levels of equity capital, ROE will be smaller than the high shadow price of 
new equity and the two objectives of increasing ROE and portfolio size are aligned.  In these cases 
management will want to obtain extra equity capital to meet the regulatory requirements of the consumer 
credit portfolio. Eventually we reach a level of equity capital where the shadow price for additional 
equity equals ROE; with larger values of equity both the optimal shadow price and ROE decrease. In this 
region increasing the portfolio size will decrease ROE even though it continues to increase expected 
profits. Eventually the unconstrained optimal Basel 0 portfolio is attained.   
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